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Abstract 
We evaluate the ability of market participants to anticipate monetary policy decisions 
in 14 countries. First, by looking at both magnitude and volatility of changes in the money 
market rates we show that the days of policy meetings are special days for financial markets. 
Second, we find that the predictability of FED, Bank of England and ECB is fully 
comparable. Finally, an econometric analysis of the ability of market participants to 
incorporate in the current short-term interest rates the expected policy changes shows that in 
the Euro area (and in other countries) policy decisions are  anticipated well in advance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The modern monetary policy literature has stressed the importance of a clear 
understanding of central bank’s actions by financial markets in the formation of expectations 
about future interest rates developments. This is so because correct expectations help the 
central bank in its conduct of the monetary policy. While central banks only control short-
term interest rates, economic theory indicates that longer-term interest rates and arbitrage 
conditions in financial markets matter the most for the transmission of monetary policy 
impulses to the economy. Longer-term interest rates, in turn, reflect expectations of future 
short-term rates and the credibility of the central bank. Hence, successful monetary policy is 
to a large extent a matter of shaping market expectations about the way in which short-term 
rates are likely to evolve not only in the period leading to the next policy decision but also 
later on.  
Market participants’ ability to predict future monetary policy decisions is often viewed 
as a direct consequence of the central bank’s transparency.
1
 A transparent overall monetary 
policy framework is therefore seen as highly desirable. This has come to be widely accepted 
by central bankers over the past decade. It is also widely acknowledged that a credible and 
predictable central bank can achieve its objective with smoother interest rate movements and 
at lower interest rate levels than a central bank with lower credibility.
2
 
The economic literature has proposed several approaches to measure the predictability 
of central banks, ranging from survey and case-study approaches to statistical/econometric 
techniques (sometimes model-based) analyzing the development in the money market 
interest rates. However, given that perfect predictability may not be attainable, it should not 
be taken as the benchmark. In this respect, a cross country comparison offers a number of 
                                                           
1
 Woodford (2005) reviews general arguments for and against central-bank transparency, while Walsh 
(2007) analyses the optimal extent to which central banks should disseminate information to the private sector. 
2
 Since the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism depends heavily on the ability of 
monetary policy to affect the course of interest rates through financial market expectations, it is often argued 
that monetary policy should induce “rule like” behaviors on the part of market participants (see for instance 
Issing, 1999). This leads them to react to new developments in a manner consistent with the monetary policy 
strategy, thus aiding the smooth conduct of the monetary policy. 
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advantages, including the possibility to examine the central bank’s predictability across 
countries (and currency unions) with distinctive monetary policy frameworks and 
communication strategies. Trying to take advantage of this possibility, although the focus of 
the paper is on the performance of the ECB relative to that of the FED and the Bank of 
England, we examine the ability of financial markets to correctly anticipate policy decisions 
in 14 central banks -- from both industrialized and emerging market economies -- over a 
period of 5 years using the changes in 1-, 3- and 12-month money market rates on the days 
of monetary policy meetings.  
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, a preliminary analysis of both 
the volatility and the magnitude of the changes in the money interest rates in the days of 
policy meetings suggests that the days in which the board of the central bank meets are 
special days. For each country, both the standard deviation and the average absolute money 
market interest rates change are significantly larger than in normal days. Second, according 
to two different measures of predictability the performance of the ECB is in line if not 
slightly better than that of the Bank of England and the FED. Finally, an econometric 
analysis of the ability of market participants to incorporate in the current interest rates the 
expected changes in the key policy rate shows that the ECB compares again very well in 
terms of predictability with the other central banks of the sample. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an analysis of the relevance of 
the policy announcements by 14 central banks for the magnitude and the volatility of the 
money market interest rate changes; Section 3 proposes two different measures of 
predictability based on the money market behavior in the days of policy meetings; Section 4 
compares the ability of financial markets in factoring into the short-term interest rates the 
expected changes in the key policy rate; Section 5 concludes. 
II. ARE POLICY MEETINGS’ DAYS DIFFERENT DAYS? 
In the paper we use data from 13 countries and 1 currency union: Australia, Canada, 
the Czech Republic, the Euro area, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, 
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Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
3
 This enables us 
to investigate predictability in a relatively large set of central banks, all of them with a 
particular focus on ensuring price stability. The sample starts in 1999, when the single 
monetary policy of the ECB began. 
Recently, several papers have investigated how well markets are able to anticipate the 
monetary policy by the Fed (Poole and Rasche; 2000, Kuttner; 2001, Demiralp and Jordà; 
2004, Ehrman and Fratzscher; 2007a) and the ECB (Hartmann et al.; 2001, Gaspar et al.; 
2001, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia; 2002, Bernoth and von Hagen; 2004), while Coppel and 
Connolly (2003) and Ehrman and Fratzscher (2007b) provided a cross-country comparison 
of some OECD economies. The main finding of this literature is that market participants in 
industrialized countries are nowadays better able to anticipate monetary policy decisions 
than in the 1980s or early 1990s. It seems plausible to assume that the improvement in 
predictability is at least in part related to the increased public availability of information 
about the monetary policy strategy and how decisions are taken. Previously, secrecy was the 
byword in central banking. Now, this trend has changed and there has been a clear progress 
towards increasing openness and transparency during the last decade. Along this line, 
Eiffinger and Geraats (2006) propose an index of transparency for a sample of industrialized 
economies based on a theory-consistent framework. 
However, previous empirical research reveals that there is a variety of different 
techniques available to model predictability. Given our heterogeneous sample, a simple 
framework, which can be easily applied to all countries, would be highly desirable. A first 
intuitive approach to measure the extent to which market participants are surprised by a 
monetary policy decision is to compute the change in money market interest rates on the 
days of the policy meetings. That is, the value: 
1 −−= ttt iiδ , 
where ti  is the market interest rate on the day of the meeting (using close of day data). The 
rationale behind using δ as a measure of monetary policy predictability is as simple as the 
                                                           
3
 We do not consider Japan, because a strong deflationary pressure has forced the Bank of Japan to keep 
nominal interest rates close to the zero lower bound level since 1995. 
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following: the higher the degree to which the market anticipates the policy decision, the 
more muted the response in the short-term interest rates on the day of the announcement. 
Thus, not only the magnitude but also the standard deviation of the changes in the market 
interest rates to policy decisions can be compared among central banks. In fact, when a 
policy decision is correctly foreseen also the market volatility should not be influenced by 
the announcement.
4
 
Which financial instrument should be used to measure the market response to policy 
announcements? In the literature a wide range of market instruments has been used to extract 
this information.
5 
Every interest rate has its own advantages and disadvantages. In particular, 
the existence of several sources of bias, as term premia and differences in the liquidity, 
complicates the extraction of a “pure measure” of predictability, especially for very short-
term rates. Furthermore, the availability of market instruments varies substantially across 
countries. In this paper, we calculate the market responses to the monetary policy decisions 
using money market rates at 1-, 3- and 12-month maturities. These rates were readily 
available for all the countries in the sample.
6
 
Table A1 (in the Appendix) shows the standard deviation of the daily changes in the 
money market rates on the days when monetary policy meetings took place, between January 
1999 and April 2004. The table also reports the standard deviation of all daily changes and 
distinguishes between announcements of decisions to alter the key interest rate and “no 
change” announcements.  
Looking at the volatility in the 1-month market rates on the policy meeting days, it is 
possible to detect a strong heterogeneity across the 14 countries. However, a standard F-test 
shows that for each country, with the exception of Thailand in the 1-month market and 
Poland in the 12-month market, the null hypothesis of identical variances between “normal” 
                                                           
4
 While the analysis of short-term rates is mostly used in the literature, other approaches are also employed 
to asses the predictability of central banks. For instance, Sager and Taylor (2004) analyze the news effect of 
monetary policy disclosure by the ECB on the foreign exchange market, while Bomfim (2003) looks at the 
influence of FED announcements on the US stock market. 
5
 See, for instance, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) for a discussion about the different instruments that can 
be employed for the Euro area and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) for an investigation on the relevance of the 
interest rate maturity for the relationship between FED funds target rates and market interest rates in the US.  
6
 In a separate Annex we report the details about each country data. 
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days and days of policy meetings can be rejected at the 5% level of significance. This result 
suggests that even in the more mature economies of the sample the volatility in the money 
market on the days of policy meetings is larger than usual.
7
 In addition, the market volatility 
around days of meetings seems to depend on the policy decision. The standard deviation of 
the changes in the money market rates when a modification in the official policy rate is 
decided is significantly larger than when the monetary policy authority does not change the 
official rate.
8
  
A second, more direct, way of investigating whether the market behavior is different 
in meetings’ days is to run a regression of the (absolute) changes in the money rates on a 
time dummy accounting for monetary policy meetings: 
(1) ;14,...1           =++= jDc jtjtjjjt εθδ  
where cj is a constant and Djt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in policy 
meetings’ days and 0 elsewhere, for each country j. 
It turns out that the dummy’s coefficient θ is always strongly significant all through 
the sample, thus supporting the idea that the days in which the board of the monetary policy 
authority meets are special days for financial markets also as concern the magnitude of the 
interest rate changes. 
III. PREDICTABILITY AROUND POLICY DECISIONS 
The Hit-Rate  
A first measure of central banks’ predictability is here constructed by comparing the 
changes in the money market in the days of policy meetings to a benchmark. Changes in 
excess of the benchmark would signal a “surprise” and thus the failure of the market in 
                                                           
7
 For the Euro area, this result is consistent with the findings in Bernoth and von Hagen (2004), in which the 
authors analyze the Euribor future rates. 
8
 According to the F-test, this result holds true for all countries and all maturities. 
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anticipating the central bank behavior. The “hit rate” is computed as the number of times (in 
per cent) the market was able to correctly anticipate the monetary policy decision.
9
 
 In order to set the benchmark, and thus to identify a surprise, we use two different 
measures: a) two times the standard deviation of all daily changes (regardless whether there 
was a policy meeting or not) and b) 12.5 basis points. Formally, for all countries, a monetary 
policy surprise is defined as: 
(a)  δσδ 2 1 >−= −kkk ii    
and/or 
(b)  0125.0 1 >−= −kkk iiδ    
where k  refers to the day of the selected meeting and δσ  is the standard deviation of the 
change in interest rates on all days of the sample.  
Measure a) compares market rate changes around monetary policy decisions with the 
general behavior of the market. A change outside the selected “confidence bands” of two 
times the standard deviation is considered a significant deviation from the “normal” market 
rate volatility, thus we say that the market has been surprised by the central bank. Measure 
b), instead, is consistent with the idea that a standard monetary policy action is an increase or 
a decrease of minimum 25 basis points in the policy rate. Thus, a change of more than 12.5 
basis points in the market rates on the day of a monetary policy meeting means that on the 
day immediately before the meeting less than 50% of the overall change was already 
factored into the market rates. This in turn suggests that market participants were surprised 
by the decision.
10
 
Figures 1 to 3 depict the key interest rates of the ECB, the FED and the Bank of 
England and the development in the 1-month money market rates in each country.
11
 The 
                                                           
9
 The use of the hit rate is common in the literature on monetary policy predictability: see for instance 
Gaspar et al. (2001), Ross (2002) and Coppel and Connolly (2003) for the setting of different benchmarks. 
10
 Note that in the case of Hungary, Poland, South Africa and Thailand, where interest rate volatility is 
relatively high, the 12.5 b.p. benchmark turns out to be the strictest criterion, while the opposite is true for the 
rest of the panel. 
11
 Hartmann et al. (2001) and Ewerhart et al. (2004) are extensive analyses of the microstructure of the Euro 
area money market, while broad analyses of the functioning of the interbank money market in the US are 
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white circles represent the meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council, the FED’s Federal 
Open Market Committee and the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee in which the 
decision on the rate was “correctly” predicted by the market (according to the 12.5 basis 
points criterion), while the black circles are those dates in which a surprise arose, regardless 
of whether the decision was to change or not the policy rate. It is possible to see that for the 
Euro area the black circles are concentrated in the first part of the graph only (Figure 1). In 
particular, the last surprise by the Governing Council is dated 17 September 2001: it seems 
that since then the ECB has significantly improved its predictability.
12
 
As for the FED, Figure 2 shows a particular feature of the US money market: the 
surprises in the 1-month rate concern only the days in which a change in the target for the 
federal funds rate was decided. All the decisions of a “no change” were correctly predicted. 
Finally, Figure 3 suggests that the financial markets in UK were more easily caught off 
guard when the MPC cut the official interest rate. It happened 6 times out of 13, a result in 
line with the findings of Ross (2002). 
Table A2a and A2b (in the Appendix) report the hit rate for the 14 countries using the 
1-, 3- and 12-month money market interest rates. The value of the hit rate is shown for both 
definitions of the benchmark. Furthermore, the tables distinguish between meetings in which 
the policy rate was changed and meetings in which the decision was not to change it. Before 
analyzing the data in detail, two general features might be noted. First, there is not a central 
bank which is the most predictable according to the two benchmarks and for all interest rate 
maturities. Second, confirming the results of the analysis of the volatility in Section 2, 
decisions of not changing the policy rate are generally better foreseen than decisions of 
changing the rate. 
According to the ranking provided by the overall hit rate in the case of the 12.5 basis 
points criterion, the Euro area has the best score: financial markets were able to correctly 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
provided by Bartolini et al. (2002) and Demiralp and Farley (2005). For the US, in the attempt of modelling the 
daily behavior of the FED funds rate, Sarno et al. (2005) have analyzed the forecasting properties of several 
econometric specifications. In addition, Colarossi and Zaghini (2007) provided an analysis of the evolution 
over time of the linkages between money markets volatilities for the US and the Euro Area. For UK related 
works see Haldane and Read (2000) and Clare and Courtenay (2001). 
12
 The “surprise” dates here identified are exactly the same Perez-Quiroz and Sicilia (2002) detected  
analyzing the jumps in the EONIA rate. 
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predict the outcome of the ECB policy meeting 94 times out of 100. The US and Australia 
follow closely with a hit rate of 91%, while the Bank of England performs slightly worse 
than the ECB and the FED with a value of the index of 84%.  
The predictability of a “no change” decision is almost perfect in the Euro area, 
regardless of the market interest rate considered. Out of the 85 meetings in which the 
decision of the Governing Council was not to change the key interest rate, there were only 
two surprises as measured by the 1-month interest rate (and one surprise as measured by the 
3-month and the 12-month rates).
13
 Only Switzerland has a record of 100% “no change” 
decisions detected in advance in all the three interest rate maturities. The US follows closely 
with only one surprise in the 12-month rates.
14
 However, both Switzerland and the US 
witnessed a much shorter number of meetings than the Euro area over the period under 
analysis (24 and 45, respectively, vs. 100). Also the UK perform fairly well with a hit rate of 
91%. As for lower degrees of predictability, a value of the index below 90% in at least one 
of the market rates is recorded in both industrialized countries (Canada, New Zealand and 
Norway) and emerging economies (Poland, South Africa and Thailand).  
When considering the meetings in which a decision to change the policy rate has been 
made, the hit rate drops significantly. Focusing again on the 1-month rates and the 12.5 basis 
points definition, the hit rate ranges from 24% in South Africa to 85% in Canada. In the Euro 
area 73% of the changes in the rate were correctly predicted by each market, i.e. 4 times out 
of 15 the market was surprised by the ECB’s decision to move the key rate. Comparing these 
results with those of other industrialized economies we can see that the Euro area hit rate is 
above those from New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and UK (ranging from 42% 
to 70%) and below those from Australia, Canada and the US (from 79% to 85%).  
The ranking of the industrialized countries is almost unchanged also according to the 
definition of the hit rate based on 2 times the standard deviation (Table A2b). However, as 
expected, the degree of predictability increases strongly in those countries in which the 
                                                           
13
 This result is in line with the findings in Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002), which identify a hit rate of 94% 
when the two-week EONIA swap money market is used over the shorter period from 1 January 1999 to 7 June 
2002. 
14
 Predictability of 100% in at least one market is also recorded in Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Sweden and the UK. 
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market volatility is larger (Hungary, Poland, South Africa and Thailand). As regards the 
general index, the Euro area performs slightly better than the US and the UK (87% vs. 80% 
and 73%, respectively). 
The money market adjustment 
A second indicator of predictability is based on the estimated measure of the financial 
markets reaction to monetary policy moves. In particular, we regress the daily changes in the 
1-month money market rate, jti∆  for country j, on a constant, α, and the changes in the key 
policy rate, jtp∆ : 
(2) jtjtjjjt pi εγα +∆+=∆ . 
The estimated coefficients on the policy changes are presented in Table 1.
15
 The 
intuition behind this technique is analogous to the volatility/magnitude analysis performed in 
the previous sections. A low value of γ implies a small market response to the policy 
announcement, thus suggesting that the market was already pricing-in and thus anticipating 
the monetary policy decision.
16
 The main difference is that equation (2) takes into account 
the differences in the average size of policy moves among central banks.  
Except for South Africa and Thailand the γ-coefficient is of the expected sign and 
significant all through the sample.
17
 In particular, Australia and Canada show the lowest 
coefficients, while Hungary and then the Czech Republic th  highest. This suggests that the 
market participants in Australia and Canada are able to predict the outcome of the central 
banks policy decisions relatively well, with a response on the days of the policy change of 
                                                           
15
 This methodology was first introduced by Cook and Hahn (1989) to examine the one-day response of 
bond rates to changes in the target Fed funds rate. 
16
 As expected, the constant is not significantly different from zero in any country. In addition, because the 
error term cannot be expected to be “white noise”, the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors of each coefficient are reported in the table. 
17
 In the case of South Africa the coefficient is not significantly different from zero, while for Thailand it is 
not significant and negative, a result which is at odds with the theory. The reason is likely to be that the money 
market is not properly developed in these countries, as already suggested in the previous section by the large 
volatility recorded. 
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only 17% of the change in the key rate, while the opposite is true for the two Eastern 
European countries, responding by between 52% to 84% of the policy change. 
Given the apparent large heterogeneity of the response to a monetary policy change 
we run a Wald test to check whether the differences in the γ coefficients are statistically 
significant across countries. In particular, we tested the null hypothesis that the value of γ for 
Canada is the same in the rest of the countries. The null hypothesis was not rejected for 
Australia and Norway (at the 1% level of significance). Thus suggesting that together with 
Canada the latter two countries perform very well in anticipating the monetary policy 
decision of the central bank. For the rest of the panel, the coefficients are significantly 
different at the 5% level, hinting to a lower degree of predictability (see the last column of 
Table 1). 
In order to “rank” the ECB, using the same test, we also investigated whether the 
coefficient for the Euro area is statistically different from the one of the other countries. The 
null hypothesis of identical values cannot be rejected for Norway, New Zealand, US, UK 
and Switzerland at the 5% level, but is rejected for Australia and Canada (indicating that the 
ECB is less predictable) and for Sweden, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic 
(indicating that the ECB is more predictable). Thus the finding of a comparable degree of 
predictability among ECB, FED and Bank of England is again confirmed by equation (2).
18
 
IV. MARKET ANTICIPATION AND PASS-THROUGH OF MONETARY POLICY 
In this section we propose an econometric analysis of the relationship between the 
key policy rate and the money market rates over a longer period before the central bank’s 
meetings, in order asses how much in advance the market is able to price-in the expected 
monetary policy decision. 
The results from regression (2), as well as all the analysis so far, rely exclusively on 
the information from market rates on the day of the monetary policy authority meeting and 
the day before. This may be in some instances insufficient, because we do not know when 
                                                           
18
 Note that for the US the value in Table 1 is the same Kuttner (2001) reports for the one-day changes in 
the 3-month US rate. 
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the market started pricing-in a change in the key rate. In fact, one runs the risk of concluding 
that market participants are perfectly anticipating a change in the official rate in situations in 
which the expectations are adjusted in a discrete way only one or two days before the policy 
meeting. This might happen if central bank officials, for instance via speeches or public 
statements, provide the public with an obvious hint about what they intend to do at the 
forthcoming meeting. 
A way to control for this problem is to examine how much of the actual change is 
already priced-in by financial markets over the two weeks before the policy announcement. 
Following Coppel and Connolly (2003), we estimate the daily differences between the 1-
month market interest rate jti  and the key policy rate jtp  for country j  as a function of a 
constant j0β , and the change in the key policy rate jtp∆ , led by 1, 5 and 10 business days, 
and lagged by 5 business days: 
(3)  jtjtjjtjjtjjtjjjtjt pppppi εβββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+=− −+++ 5410352110 . 
The coefficients β1j, β2j and β3j can be interpreted as estimates of the degree to which 
the market has already priced-in the policy change one day, one week and two weeks ahead 
of the meeting, respectively. A value of zero would indicate that changes in the rate were 
generally unexpected by the market at those dates. On the contrary, a large value of the 
coefficients would suggest that the market was able to correctly anticipate (well in advance) 
the decisions to change the key interest rates. However, while β1j can be directly taken as the 
share of the policy change that was anticipated by market participants one day before the 
meeting, β2j and β3j should be interpreted more cautiously. In fact, the one month interest 
rate reflects the expected average interest rate over the coming month and thus includes 
expectations of an unchanged key rate prior to the policy meeting and a different rate (lower 
or higher) afterwards. Finally, the coefficient β4j can be interpreted as a measure of the pass-
through of the key policy rate to market rates within a week after the move. A value close to 
zero would indicate that the changes in policy rates are fully passed-trough in the 1-month 
money market rates in 5 business days.  
In Table 2 we report the estimated values of the coefficients from equation (3) and the 
Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors for the whole 
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set of countries under analysis. The standard tests suggest that while the 1-day anticipation 
coefficient is highly significant in each of the 14 countries, the 5-day coefficient is less 
significant in Hungary and South Africa (5% and 10%, respectively) and it is not significant 
in Poland. At the same time, the 10-day coefficient is only weakly or non-significant in all 
the emerging market economies and in Switzerland. Excluding the countries where at least 
one of the policy anticipation coefficients is not significant, the table show that β1j, β2j and 
β3j are relatively similar across the panel. They are the highest in Australia and Canada, and 
the lowest in Hungary. As expected, they are decreasing with respect to distance of the 
policy meeting, i.e. β1j, > β2j > β3j, suggesting that the closer the meeting, the larger the 
degree of pricing-in by the market. 
As for the lag-indicators, Table 2 suggests that while the policy moves have generally 
been fully passed-through within a week, there are some significant β4j coefficients. A 
positive coefficient as in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US might suggests that 
market participants started to price-in well in advance the policy decision of the following 
month. 
Concluding, it can be stated, with all the caution that is needed when directly 
comparing regression coefficients, that the degree of policy moves anticipation in the Euro 
area is around the average of industrialized economies and in line with central banks with a 
longer history such as the FED and the Bank of England.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Historically, for a variety of reasons, central banks have chosen different ways of 
communicating with the public and have relied on different instruments to be transparent. In 
addition, in the economic literature there are different views about the optimal degree of 
transparency. In some papers, like Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) and Gross (2002), 
transparency is identified with the amount and/or the degree of precision of information that 
central banks release to the public. According to other views, what is important, instead,  is 
that the central bank provides the public with a clear understanding of the framework of the 
analysis and the procedures that the monetary authority follows in deciding what to do. The 
best way to communicate this to the public is by offering an explanation of the decisions that 
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have been already made. It follows that openness, and thus the release of information, is 
desirable only to the extent to which it enhances the understanding of the central bank 
behavior.
19
  
However, over the past decade, it has come to be widely accepted that transparency 
in monetary policy making is highly desirable, since the effectiveness of monetary impulses 
improves when financial markets understand how the central bank conducts the monetary 
policy and why decisions are taken. In particular, better information by market participants 
about central bank actions and intentions increases the degree to which monetary authorities 
can actually affect market’s expectations about future changes in the official rate and thus 
about long-term interest rates. This paper has examined the predictability, i.e. the ability of 
financial markets in anticipating monetary policy decisions, of 14 different central banks 
with various monetary policy frameworks and different ways of communicating to the 
public. 
As in any cross-country analysis, it should be born in mind that several caveats are 
associated with this kind of direct comparison. In particular, the properties of the financial 
instruments used to evaluate market expectations about future policy decisions may vary 
across countries. Different types of liquidity, term and risk premia may affect the findings 
obtained in the exercises performed in this study. Another factor, which is worth mentioning, 
is the evolution in the macroeconomic environment occurred in the period under review.  A 
large part of the overall increase in predictability in some countries over the last decade has 
probably been due to a lower general level of interest rates, as inflation levels have fallen, 
and greater macroeconomic stability has been achieved. This makes it difficult to isolate 
with precision the contribution of the increased transparency in central banks behavior in 
reducing the volatility in short-term rates. Finally, a third caveat concerns the span of our 
time sample, which, in order to include the Euro area, is relatively short. However, even if 
the analysis of the money market dynamics started in January 1999, the number of policy 
meetings and interest rates changes were large enough for the standard statistical exercises to 
be performed. 
                                                           
19
 See Winkler (2000), Woodford (2003 and 2005) and Thornton (2003) among others. 
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Using money market rates at different maturities we reached two results. First, by 
comparing measures of the magnitude and the volatility of the changes in the money markets 
rates in the days of the policy meetings, we showed that the days in which policy decisions 
are taken are special days for financial markets. Second, according to two different measures 
of predictability and via an assessment of the ability of financial agents in incorporating well 
in advance the policy decisions into market rates, we showed that the overall predictability 
of the ECB is in line with that of our two “benchmarks”: the FED and the Bank of England. 
Our findings fit well with other recent contributions, especially about the Euro area. 
In fact our results are fully consistent with works employing somewhat different kinds of 
analysis and relying on different measures of predictability such as the studies by Perez-
Quiros and Sicilia (2002) and Bernoth and von Hagen (2004). In addition, also the 
international ranking of the ECB with respect to other central banks and in particular the 
comparison with the FED and the Bank of England is confirmed by several sources (Ross, 
2002; Coppel and Connolly, 2003). 
Future extensions of the work may point to assess whether some specific 
characteristics of the monetary policy and communication strategy of a central bank have 
influence on its predictability. For instance, while all the countries in our sample have the 
price stability as central part of their policy objective, the ECB, the Swiss National Bank and 
the FED are the only central banks without a formal inflation target. A possible exercise 
could evaluate whether inflation target countries are more predictable than others. In 
addition, also other and modalities of the policy framework like the publication of the 
minutes of the meetings and the voting record may be assessed. 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
Table 1 
MARKET RESPONSE TO MONETARY POLICY MOVES 
 
    
Country Rate changes Estimates of γ
(1)(2)
 Wald test 
(2)(3)
 
    
    
Australia 15 0.17** 0.01 
  (0.06)  
Canada 26 0.17* -- 
  (0.07)  
Czech Republic 21 0.52** 345.6** 
  (0.10)  
Euro area 15 0.26** 16.98** 
  (0.09)  
Hungary 26 0.84** 368.1** 
  (0.11)  
New Zealand 18 0.26* 7.18** 
  (0.09)  
Norway 21 0.21** 1.81 
  (0.07)  
Poland 25 0.38** 29.28** 
  (0.13)  
South Africa 14 0.02 -- 
  (0.13)  
Sweden 16 0.37** 172.2** 
  (0.09)  
Switzerland 10 0.28** 18.64** 
  (0.07)  
Thailand 5 -0.30 -- 
  (0.25)  
United Kingdom 19 0.29** 10.72** 
  (0.09)  
United States 19 0.27** 25.51** 
  (0.11)  
 
(1) Newey-West standard errors in brackets; – (2) * and ** represent significance at 5% and 
1%, respectively. – (3) Null hypothesis: γ for Canada equals γ  for the rest of the countries. 
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Table 2 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
       
Country Rate changes β1
(1)
 β2
(1)
 β3
(1)
 β4
(1)
 R
2
 
       
      
Australia 15 0.94*** 0.61*** 0.42*** 0.12*** 0.17 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  
Canada 26 0.78*** 0.59*** 0.43*** 0.05** 0.16 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02)  
Czech Republic 21 0.41*** 0.33*** 0.11 0.15 0.14 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)  
Euro area 15 0.72*** 0.50*** 0.33*** 0.01 0.14 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)  
Hungary 26 0.24*** 0.05** 0.10* 0.23** 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.11)  
New Zealand 18 0.84*** 0.70*** 0.48*** 0.14*** 0.08 
  (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)  
Norway 21 0.72*** 0.56*** 0.39*** -0.02 0.10 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06)  
Poland 25 0.49*** 0.01 0.01 -0.15 0.04 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.10) (0.07)  
South Africa 14 0.62*** 0.25* 0.12 -0.38 0.01 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17)  
Sweden 16 0.53*** 0.39*** 0.23*** -0.02 0.14 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)  
Switzerland 10 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.08 -0.30 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)  
Thailand 5 1.62*** 1.51*** 0.46 1.38*** 0.01 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.29) (0.07)  
United Kingdom 19 0.66*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.07 0.08 
  (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)  
United States 19 0.79*** 0.60*** 0.36*** 0.16 0.18 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)  
       
(1) Newey-West standard errors in brackets; *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. – (2) Null hypothesis: γ for Canada equals γ for the rest of the 
countries. 
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Figure 1 
Monetary policy and market interest rates in the euro area
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1-month money market rate and the rate on the main refinancing operations. 
Suprises defined according to the 12.5 basis points criterion.
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1-month money market rate and the target for the federal funds rate. 
Suprises defined according to the 12.5 basis points criterion.
Monetary policy and market interest rates in the United States
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Figure 3 
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1-month money market rate and the official  repo  rate. 
Suprises defined according to the 12.5 basis points criterion.
Monetary policy and market interest rates in the United Kingdom
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 
Meetings
(1)
Maturity All days All meetings Changes Non-changes
Australia 58 1-month 2.5 6.1 9.1 4.5
(26%) 3-month 3.1 5.6 8.6 3.6
12-month 4.5 6.3 8.6 4.9
Canada 35 1-month 2.3 9.7 10.8 6.0
(74%) 3-month 2.9 8.1 9.0 4.5
12-month 4.7 7.9 8.8 4.9
Czech Republic 68 1-month 3.7 13.1 16.7 0.9
(31%) 3-month 3.5 9.1 12.2 0.4
12-month 4.1 8.0 11.6 0.9
Euro area 100 1-month 2.6 6.8 15.4 3.4
(15%) 3-month 2.4 5.6 12.6 2.5
12-month 3.3 5.8 10.6 4.3
Hungary 37 1-month 20.1 72.9 88.8 3.9
(68%) 3-month 16.3 62.3 75.5 15.4
12-month 16.0 58.2 70.4 16.6
New Zealand 41 1-month 4.1 10.7 15.4 3.2
(44%) 3-month 4.0 11.3 16.0 4.4
12-month 4.6 12.4 15.7 8.7
Norway 48 1-month 6.2 16.5 21.3 9.5
(44%) 3-month 4.8 13.9 17.9 8.0
12-month 5.3 13.9 16.7 10.0
Poland 50 1-month 20.0 41.8 60.3 12.0
(50%) 3-month 15.4 31.2 43.7 12.3
12-month 19.1 22.5 30.1 13.1
South Africa 29 1-month 24.1 32.6 45.3 16.2
(48%) 3-month 14.4 25.1 34.5 11.1
12-month 14.6 25.8 35.3 11.9
Sweden 55 1-month 2.4 8.8 15.2 3.8
(29%) 3-month 2.6 7.4 12.5 3.3
12-month 3.5 6.7 10.0 4.6
Switzerland 24 1-month 3.8 12.4 16.6 2.1
(50%) 3-month 3.7 11.7 15.8 2.0
12-month 3.5 8.9 11.5 2.6
Thailand 34 1-month 17.1 14.5 27.2 10.3
(15%) 3-month 9.9 13.1 19.3 12.1
12-month 7.6 10.8 13.7 10.3
United Kingdom 64 1-month 3.2 8.4 12.2 5.3
(28%) 3-month 2.5 7.0 11.5 3.1
12-month 3.9 8.3 12.8 5.3
United States 45 1-month 2.9 12.3 18.3 0.9
(42%) 3-month 3.1 10.0 14.4 1.2
12-month 4.7 9.4 12.8 4.5
Sample: January 1999 - April 2004.
(1) Percentage of changes in brackets.
Standard deviation in basis points
VOLATILITY IN THE MONEY MARKET RATES
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Table A2a 
Meetings
(1)
Maturity All meeting Changes Non-changes
Australia 58 1-month 91% 80% 95%
(26%) 3-month 96% 87% 100%
12-month 91% 73% 98%
Canada 35 1-month 86% 85% 89%
(74%) 3-month 89% 89% 89%
12-month 86% 81% 100%
Czech Republic 68 1-month 76% 40% 98%
(31%) 3-month 84% 50% 100%
12-month 85% 60% 100%
Euro area 100 1-month 94% 73% 98%
(15%) 3-month 95% 73% 99%
12-month 95% 73% 99%
Hungary 37 1-month 49% 24% 100%
(68%) 3-month 49% 28% 92%
12-month 51% 32% 92%
New Zealand 41 1-month 84% 70% 96%
(44%) 3-month 84% 70% 96%
12-month 72% 60% 83%
Norway 48 1-month 73% 62% 81%
(44%) 3-month 75% 62% 85%
12-month 73% 57% 85%
Poland 50 1-month 65% 50% 85%
(50%) 3-month 76% 71% 88%
12-month 71% 63% 77%
South Africa 29 1-month 40% 21% 67%
(48%) 3-month 57% 36% 80%
12-month 60% 50% 80%
Sweden 55 1-month 88% 63% 98%
(29%) 3-month 96% 88% 100%
12-month 96% 88% 100%
Switzerland 24 1-month 71% 42% 100%
(50%) 3-month 71% 42% 100%
12-month 83% 67% 100%
Thailand 34 1-month 80% 60% 83%
(15%) 3-month 77% 40% 83%
12-month 89% 80% 90%
United Kingdom 64 1-month 84% 61% 93%
(28%) 3-month 89% 61% 100%
12-month 89% 72% 96%
United States 45 1-month 91% 79% 100%
(42%) 3-month 89% 74% 100%
12-month 87% 68% 98%
Sample: January 1999 - April 2004.
(1) Percentage of changes in brackets.
HIT RATE: 12.5 BASIS POINTS CRITERION
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Table A2b 
Meetings
(1)
Maturity All meeting Changes Non-changes
Australia 58 1-month 71% 40% 81%
(26%) 3-month 78% 40% 90%
12-month 86% 60% 95%
Canada 35 1-month 77% 74% 89%
(74%) 3-month 80% 78% 89%
12-month 80% 78% 89%
Czech Republic 68 1-month 68% 14% 93%
(31%) 3-month 78% 32% 100%
12-month 82% 50% 98%
Euro area 100 1-month 87% 47% 95%
(15%) 3-month 87% 47% 94%
12-month 89% 67% 93%
Hungary 37 1-month 73% 62% 100%
(68%) 3-month 70% 62% 92%
12-month 70% 62% 92%
New Zealand 41 1-month 79% 60% 96%
(44%) 3-month 79% 60% 96%
12-month 65% 50% 78%
Norway 48 1-month 73% 62% 81%
(44%) 3-month 73% 57% 85%
12-month 65% 52% 74%
Poland 50 1-month 88% 77% 96%
(50%) 3-month 90% 81% 96%
12-month 92% 86% 96%
South Africa 29 1-month 87% 71% 100%
(48%) 3-month 83% 64% 100%
12-month 83% 64% 100%
Sweden 55 1-month 72% 38% 88%
(29%) 3-month 75% 63% 83%
12-month 86% 88% 85%
Switzerland 24 1-month 58% 17% 100%
(50%) 3-month 67% 34% 100%
12-month 62% 25% 100%
Thailand 34 1-month 91% 60% 97%
(15%) 3-month 86% 40% 93%
12-month 94% 80% 97%
United Kingdom 64 1-month 73% 58% 80%
(28%) 3-month 78% 53% 89%
12-month 80% 68% 84%
United States 45 1-month 80% 53% 100%
(42%) 3-month 80% 53% 100%
12-month 82% 63% 94%
Sample: January 1999 - April 2004.
(1) Percentage of changes in brackets.
HIT RATE: 2 TIMES STANDARD DEVIATION CRITERION
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